1 Carmichael (1987) was the first to refer to empirical evidence showing that in practice the government often sets its policy only after it observes firms' action. See also Gruenspecht (1988) and Neary (1991) .
2 See for instance Mansfield, et al. (1981) and Levine, et al. (1987) for a comprehensive empirical analysis of the causes, forms and aspects of attenuated appropriability due to the inability to capture the induced benefits of innovating activity and intellectual property. Vishwasrao (1993) , for example, refers to USITC documents (1988) reporting aggregate losses for US firms amounting to 23.8 billion dollars due to inadequate IPR protection. 1
Introduction
It seems that tempting arguments advocating "strategic trade policy" have not convinced the majority of economists that the profession's traditional support for free trade should be abandoned. Until recently, this stance mostly reflected either the a priori position of the economists who argued against trade activism, (see, for instance, Baghwati, 1989 , Krugman, 1987 or results obtained in "calibration" models, which indicated that gains were at best modest when strategic trade policies are applied as profit shifting or facilitating devices (see, for instance, Venables, 1994 and Krugman and Smith, 1994) .
Recently a third serious drawback to the theory of strategic trade policies has surfaced.
As Neary and Leahy, (2000) pointed out, "... that governments and firms are likely to differ in their ability to commit to future action". Thus, the government may lack credibility with the firms whose behaviour it tries to influence or there may be a time lag between the announcement and the implementation of strategic trade policies. As a consequence, the government may be forced to select its policy only after the strategic choice of domestic firms has taken place. 1 This gives a strategic motive to the domestic firm to influence (or manipulate) the government's policy response. In these circumstances, it has been claimed, implementing the strategic trade policy can cause inefficiencies and consequently can lead to lower social welfare compared to the corresponding social welfare under free trade (see for instance, Goldberg 1995 , Karp and Perloff, 1995 , Neary and O'Sullivan,1997 , Maggi and Grossman, 1998 , Leahy and Neary, 2000 , Ionaşcu and ðigi, 2001 .
ðigi (2000),on the other hand, argued that in the particular case where free trade leads to unilateral violations of intellectual property rights (IPR) via, say, R&D spillovers, efficiency and welfare losses may be large due to the well known appropriability problem 2 as well as to the somewhat less known failure of the domestic firm to fully exploit economies of scale (see ðigi, 2000) . This causes the use of strategic trade to be strictly superior to free trade. More 3 It is intriguing that Herguera, et al. (2002) obtained similar results in a rather different context of vertical product differentiation without spillovers but with the three-stage game structure identical to ours. Namely, they found that when government cannot commit to its policy choice, there is a higher social welfare than in the case when the government is able to commit to its policy. Moreover, they also showed that the optimal tariff in the "commitment" case is higher than its corresponding "non-commitment" counterpart. However, the economics and the intuition of their findings are rather different from ours. 2 specifically, ðigi (2000) showed that when domestic and foreign firms compete in quantities on the domestic market and there are IPR violations by the foreign firm, a strategic tariff reduces or completely eliminates illegally appropriated research output and thus thwarts IPR violations and enhances investment in R&D. However, these findings were obtained under the recently challenged assumption that the government can commit to its policy instrument before the domestic firm chooses its strategy.
The primary goal of this paper is to show that when R&D spillovers (or unilateral IPR violations) prevail and the domestic government cannot commit ex ante, the benefits of strategic trade policy measured in terms of social welfare are generally larger than social welfare under the corresponding commitment regime. In other words, we claim that the inability of the domestic government to commit to a tariff policy before the domestic firm's strategic decision does not weaken the case for strategic trade policy in the above setup. On contrary, this inability generally reinforces it. Related to this finding is the observation that the optimal tariff in the commitment regime is always larger (and therefore more distortional) than the corresponding optimal tariff in the non-commitment regime 3 .
Another contribution of the recent strategic trade literature, primarily due to Neary and Leahy (1996 , 1997 , stresses the distinction between "first-best" and "second-best" policy. The "first-best" versus "second-best" policy issue arises in the context of dynamic games where domestic firms have more than one choice variable (e.g. level of R&D and level of output). In this setup the first best policy in principle includes more than one policy instrument in order to induce socially desirable levels of all choice variable. However, in many circumstances the government may be constrained to a smaller number of instruments or even only one instrument (say an R&D subsidy). Such constrained policies are usually termed "second-best" (or even "third best"). One of the interesting results from this literature is that, in the case of Cournot competition, the R&D subsidy, which is generally positive in the "second-best" policy setup, turned out to be negative (an R&D tax) when the "first-best" policy 4 In the rest of the article we use the term "unit costs " instead of the more correct "unit variable costs". 3 was implemented. We show that this is not the case in our model and that the R&D subsidy is always positive in the both "first-best" and "second-best" policy.
The model

Assumptions
The core model is assumed to be a Cournot type duopolistic competition between a "domestic" and a "foreign" firm competing on the domestic market where the domestic firm undertakes the innovation effort in reducing unit costs while the foreign firm benefits from this innovation via spillovers (or IPR violations). Much like in ðigi (2000), the domestic firm is assumed to have constant unit variable costs of production C = α -f(x), where x stands for R&D expenditures and f(x) is an "R&D production function" with properties, f(x) # α, f(0) = 0, f'(x) > 0 and f''(x) < 0. However, in order to simplify the analysis and also to make it directly comparable with the dominant approach in modelling process innovation (see, for instance, d'Aspermont and Jacquemin, 1988, Neary, 1997, Hinloopen, 1997,.etc Parameter α can be thought of as pre-innovative constant unit costs describing an old technology initially accessible to both the domestic and the foreign firms. The foreign firm that exports its production to the domestic country pays a specific tariff t per unit of output. Its unit (pre-tariff) cost function is c = α -β y where β 0[0,1] denotes the level of spillovers (or, equivalently, level of the strength of IPR protection).
The inverse demand function in the domestic market (assumed to be linear with units chosen such that the slope of the inverse demand function is equal to one) is P = A -Q where Q = q d +q f and A > α. The parameter A captures the size of the market, whereas q d and q f denote the choice variables, that is, the corresponding quantities, of the domestic and the 5 Condition (ii) is in fact the value of the Hessian determinant of the function W(y,t) and it verifies the second order conditions for all maximization problems in the analysis. 6 The monopoly profit as a function of R&D is given by (A-α+y) 2 / 4 -h(y). The concavity implies that its derivative and hence the function ½ (A-α+y)-h'(y) decreases in y for y$0 (see Kamin et al.) 7 See ðigi (2000) for a discussion of strategic predation strategy.
foreign firms.
Social welfare (W) is defined as the sum of consumer surplus (S), the firm's profit (Π) and the revenue from tariffs (R).
The assumptions concerning the well-defined optimization problems as well as the issue of the existence and viability of duopoly are summarized below:
(i) h'(0) = h(0) = 0 and h'(α) > 8/81 (2A + α (1 -β))(3 -β)
(ii) h''(y*) $1 -2/3 β(1 -2/3 β) (iii) a) h''(y*) $2/9 (2 -β) (4 -2β + (7-β(7 -4β) ) ½ ) and b) W* d (t*(β),β) $ W* m where W* d stands for the optimal level of social welfare in duopoly when the domestic government can commit to a tariff and W* m stands for social welfare generated when the domestic firm acts as monopolist.
Assumption (i) ensures that the optimal unit cost reduction, y*, is positive but lower than α. Assumption (ii) ensures that sufficient second order conditions are satisfied for all maximization problems in the analysis 5 . For this to hold the social welfare function, W (.), needs to be strictly concave in y and t which in turn requires the "R&D cost function", h(y), to be increasing in y and convex enough. We also assume that the corresponding monopoly profit is a strictly concave function for y$ 0. 6 Assumption (iii) guarantees the viability of duopoly. In other words, a strategy that leads to the elimination of the foreign competitor-"strategic predation"-would be too expensive and is never optimal for the domestic firm 7 . Using the language of Dixit (1980) , the domestic firm is only able to exhibit "limited leadership". More specifically, the marginal cost of the unit cost reduction, h'(y), has to be "steep enough" so that its intersection with the accompanied marginal benefit occurs at a level of y* such that y*< y p #α where y p is the level of unit cost reduction that leads to the zero output of the foreign firm in the equilibrium (assumption (iii) a). The sufficient condition that ensures "enough steepness" 9 In fact, it is not difficult to demonstrate that the viability of duopoly (i.e condition (iii)) automatically implies the satisfaction of the appropriate second order condition described by (ii). Thus in a sense, condition (ii) is redundant, yet we display it due to convenience. 10 For the whole spectrum of possibilities of commitment patterns between the firms and the government in a dynamic games setting, see Leahy and Neary, 1996. 5 of h'(y) is given by (iv). 8 Moreover, it also has to be non-optimal for the welfare maximizing government to set the tariff that would induce the level of y that is equal to or larger than y p (assumption (iii) b). Finally note that the assumption (iii) imposes even stronger restriction on h''(y) than (ii) 9 .
In order to focus on strategic interactions, most authors use a "third market" assumption, whereby domestic and foreign firms compete on a common export market. As a consequence, only the domestic firm's profit (net of subsidy) enters the social welfare function (see for instance, Karp and Perloff, 1995 , Neary and O'Sullivan,1997 , Leahy and Neary, 2000 . Our welfare function is more comprehensive and the task of the domestic government is not constrained to only strategic interactions but also takes into account the impact of the domestic firm's strategic choices on consumer surplus and tariff revenue.
The key assumption, as has been made clear, is that the government imposes the tariff only after it observes the domestic firm's choice of unit cost reduction. We call this government policy the "non-commitment" regime and the associated variables have the attached subscript "nc". On the other hand, the "commitment regime" implies that government is capable of committing inter-temporally to a tariff prior to the domestic firm's choice of unit cost reduction.
This policy regime was discussed in ðigi (2000) and the associated variables carry the subscript "c". Note that both "nc" and "c" regimes are in fact "second-best" policies, since there is only one policy instrument and two choice variables (unit cost reduction and quantities). 
The game
We consider a sequential (threeSstage) game. In the first stage, the domestic firm strategically chooses its innovation effort and consequent unit cost reduction. In the second
stage the non-committed government sets the tariff on imports after it observes the firm's choice of y. Finally, in the last stage, the firms select quantities, and consequently, profits and welfare are realised. Alternatively, we can, following Neary and Leahy (2000) adopt a two stage framework in which the government in the second stage of the game is able to commit only intra-temporally, setting its policy instrument, tariff, before the firms choose the quantities.
Then, in the first stage the domestic firm selects the unit cost reduction.
We concentrate on the domestic market (alternatively, we may impose a segmented market hypothesis), in which duopoly is assumed to be a viable market form both before and after the tariff is set. In order to ascertain the subgame perfect equilibrium, we proceed by solving the game backwards. In the last (third) stage, the firms choose the equilibrium quantities. The domestic firm maximizes given q f .
The first-order condition for an interior maximum is MΠ d /Mq d = 0 and yields A -2q d -q f -C = 0.
The optimization problem for the foreign firm yields:
given q d and t. The first-order condition is: A -2q f -q d -c -t = 0. Solving the reaction functions yields the Cournot outputs as an implicit function of y:
Substituting (2.a) and (2.b) into (1.a) yields the domestic firm's profit function expressed in terms of y, R&D investment costs, h(y), and tariff:
In the second stage of the game, the domestic government selects the optimal tariff given the unit cost reduction of the domestic firm. Its objective function is given by the expression W*(t) = Π*(t) + S*(t) + R*(t)
where consumer surplus, S*(t) and tariff revenue, R*(t) are respectively given by and Note that domestic profit monotonically increases in tariff (the higher the tariff the larger the effective unit cost difference and, consequently, the higher the domestic firm's profit) while consumer surplus monotonically declines in tariff. Finally, the function R(t) initially increases in t as t goes above zero, reaches its maximum at t = 1/4 (A -α -y(1-2β)), but eventually falls to zero as t reaches the prohibitive tariff, t p , a tariff that causes the exit of the foreign firm. Thus, the function W(t) is strictly concave in t with d 2 W(t)/dt 2 = -1 < 0 while the whole tariff domain on which duopoly is defined is given by the interval tε[0,t p ].
Assuming an interior maximum, the optimal tariff, t nc * is obtained by solving dW/dt = 0, 
Finally, in the first stage of the game the domestic firm selects the optimal level of marginal costs reduction, y, taking into account its subsequent impact on both its foreign rival's behaviour (strategic effect) and on the government's choice of tariff (manipulation effect). By substituting t nc * into (3) we obtain
Maximizing (8) with respect to y gives the first order condition 12 and (implicitly) the optimal y nc *:
Note that the optimal reduction in unit costs could be obtained more elegantly and more intuitively by comparing the marginal cost and benefits of an increase in y. A small increase of y positively affects the subsequent government tariff by Mt/My. This in turn, increases domestic operational profit, π* = 1/9 (A -α + t nc * + y(2-β) ) 2 , (that is, the profit before the costs of innovation were subtracted) by Mπ*/Mt. In addition, a given increase in y also increases the domestic firm's operational profit directly by Mπ*/My. The associated cost of such a marginal increase is h'(y). Thus, the optimal y nc * is found at the point where the marginal benefit of a decrease in unit costs equals its marginal costs, that is, where M π*/Mt Mt/My + M π*/My = h'(y)
holds. This expression describes the same first order condition (9).
Tariffs, R&D and Welfare in the Two Regimes
Optimal tariffs are positive
Before comparing relevant variables in the two regimes, we first show that the optimal tariff is indeed positive. This can been checked by evaluating the impact of the tariff on social 13 Expression (10) is a modified version of the corresponding equation in ðigi, (2000) where the transformation y / f(x) is used.
14 A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this result to hold is that there be a "positive terms of trade effect," which, in this context, means that the new equilibrium price rises by less than the increase in tariff. This is surely the case with a linear demand function. 15 Note that (11) gives only an implicit tariff since y c * = y*(t) is an implicit function of the tariff.
welfare. We begin with the optimal tariff in the commitment regime where marginal social welfare is given by 14 Finally, the solution of (10) gives us the optimal tariff, t c * in the commitment regime 15 :
The proof that dW nc *(t=0)/dt >0 is even simpler because in the non-commitment regime the government sets the tariff only after the home firm sets R&D, so the analogue to (10) is given by (12):
implying dW nc *(t=0)/dt = (y nc *(1-β)+t)/3 > 0. It is also obvious from expression (7) that the optimal 16 More specifically, the only force that preserves duopoly as the optimal market structure in both the commitment and non-commitment regime is tariff revenue.
17 Both y c * and y nc * decline monotonically in β on the whole range of β 0 [0, 1] . This implies the faster decline of y c * in β starts already at the level of β = 0.
18 Reitzes (1991) was probably the first to demonstrate the positive impact of strategic tariff on R&D. 10 tariff in a non-commitment regime is positive.
The more relevant question than positivity of tariff in this setup would be whether the optimal tariff is in the interior of the set tε[0,t p ] since it may easily be the case that the optimal tariff is exactly at t p or even beyond it (see ðigi, 2000). It is here that assumption (iii) enters into play, ensuring the interior, non-prohibitive duopoly tariff in the optimum. In other words, when spillovers are zero or very small, y c * > y nc *, but as soon as a certain low level of β = β r < ½ is reached, the reverse becomes true, implying that y nc * declines more slowly than y c * as the level of spillovers increases.
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The relationship between y c * and y nc * is not obvious a priori. On the one hand, the government in the commitment regime can affect via tariff the socially insufficient level of unit cost reduction, stimulating the investment in R&D that leads to a higher reduction in unit costs However, this "technological function" of tariff is of a limited power due to its offsetting, negative side: an increase in tariff leads to a price increase in equilibrium and thus, has an adverse direct effect on the consumer surplus. On the other hand, in the non-commitment regime the technological function of tariff is absent, but the domestic firm has an incentive to invest in unit cost reduction in order to manipulate the government and induce a higher tariff on imports. This additional motive to invest in R&D and in unit cost reduction is not present in the commitment regime so this, so called, "manipulating" incentive leads to the comparably higher investment in R&D and consequently, a higher unit cost reduction as soon as the spillover level exceeds a certain low level, β r < ½ .
The clue for this result lies in the lower sensitivity of y nc * with respect to the change in spillovers level as compared to corresponding sensitivity of y c * to spillovers. To understand the intuition behind the lesser sensitivity of unit cost reduction on spillovers in the non-commitment regime, we briefly review the characteristics of the firm's strategic behaviour in the context under consideration. First, it is well known that in dynamic Cournot duopoly models, where the domestic firm exhibits "limited leadership", the domestic firm (incumbent) "over-invests" in its strategic variable in order to gain advantage over its competitor. In other words, it pursues a so called "top dog" strategy that makes the domestic firm "tough" (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984, Tirole, 1991) . The notion of over-investment is defined with respect to the non-strategic benchmark in which the domestic firm selects its strategic variable ignoring its impact on the subsequent stage variable of the competitor. However, this "top dog" strategy becomes more and more "diluted" with an increase in spillovers. In fact, the higher the spillovers, the more the foreign firm appropriates the innovative output of the domestic firm and consequently the higher are the disincentives to invest in R&D. Thus, after a certain threshold level of β a disincentive effect of spillovers starts to dominate so that the "top dog" strategy turns into a "soft", non aggressive, "puppy dog" strategy leading to under-investment vis-à-vis the non-strategic benchmark (see subsection 3.2.1 for an example and graphic representation). In other words, since this strategic investment is aimed directly at the competitor, it is very sensitive to spillovers.
On the other hand, in the non-commitment regime, there is an additional, " manipulating" motive that the domestic firm faces on top of the standard strategic investment motive described above. Namely, the domestic firm has an incentive to manipulate the government decision on the tariff because in the non-commitment regime a higher unit cost reduction induces a higher tariff, that in turn benefits the domestic firm's profit. This additional motive for over-investment is not present in the commitment regime and it is targeted at the domestic government and not directly at the foreign firm. Thus the "manipulating" investment is therefore less vulnerable to spillovers. Consequently, the overall R&D investments in the non-commitment regime (that can conceptually be broken up into two parts: strategic and manipulating R&D investment) are less sensitive to spillovers than the corresponding R&D (and unit cost reduction) in the commitment regime.
An example
In order to illustrate the relationship between the unit cost reduction in the two regimes more transparently, we make use of the specific "R&D cost function" which is derived from the following "R&D production function": y = (g x) ½ (see Chin and Grossman,1991, and ðigi, 2000, for applications of this R&D production function). The appropriate transformation yields, h(y) = y 2 /g. The parameter g captures R&D efficiency so that a bigger g implies an easier reduction in unit costs. The assumptions (i), (ii) and especially (iii) impose the upper bound on the parameter g. For duopoly to be an equilibrium market structure, it cannot be optimal for either the domestic firm or the domestic government to pursue strategic predation (see ðigi, 2000) . This, in turn, implies that R&D investments are assumed to be not "too efficient" or alternatively, unit cost reduction that induces the exit of the foreign firm should not be a profitable strategy for the The lower sensitivity of y* nc to spillovers compared to y* c is easy to observe in Figure 1 .
The benchmark, non-strategic unit cost reduction, labelled y* ns , is clearly the least sensitive to spillovers due to its non-strategic nature. The threshold level of β after which an over-investment, 19 It is easy to check that tariff revenue increases in y provided that β is large enough.
Welfare in the two regimes
The above discussion of optimal unit cost reduction and of the implied R&D levels in the two regimes serves as a prelude, to the key comparison of relative social welfare. As a corollary of Lemma 1, we put forward the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1
The The socially optimal level of unit costs reduction, (labelled y**), does not coincide with the domestic firm's unit cost reduction in either of the two regimes, since the domestic firm does not take into account the beneficial impact of its marginal cost reduction on the consumer surplus and its impact on tariff revenue. More precisely, the socially optimal marginal cost reduction is above both y* nc and y* c . To verify the claim that y** > y* ( where "y*" stands for either y nc * or y c *), it suffices to show that dW*(y*)/dy > 0 and to recall that the social welfare function is strictly concave in y by assumption (ii). Thus, a "small" increase in y beyond y* generates more social welfare by increasing consumer surplus than the resulting social welfare loss due to the fall in the firm's profit and a possible decline in tariff revenue. As can be seen from (15) this result holds even in the absence of spillovers. However, the presence of spillovers aggravates the departure from the social optimum since the domestic firm experiences disincentives to invest in unit cost reduction due to inability to fully appropriate all of the benefits of its innovating activity. In other words, the gap between y** and y* is lower in the absence of spillovers.
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The fact that the domestic firm, regardless of the regime, under-invests in R&D from the social point of view and therefore has a lower than socially optimal unit cost reduction, should not be confused with the firm's strategy which we call "over-investment" (which is optimal up to certain level of spillovers). The notion of "over-investment" is defined in relation to the domestic firm's non-strategic behaviour in which it ignores the strategic effect of unit cost reduction on the foreign firm's second stage variable (that is, on its output) and has nothing to do with the socially optimal level of R&D investment, h(y**). However, there is an important case when "top dog"
behaviour and "manipulative" over-investment in R&D also imply "over-investment" from the social point of view. This appears in so called "third market" models where the social welfare function coincides with domestic firm profit (net of subsides/taxes) and where the domestic government (assuming the foreign government is passive and also assuming dynamic Cournot duopoly with "small" or zero spillovers) faces potentially three types of strategic considerations:
the standard "profit shifting" motive, the government's motive to counteract the domestic firm's strategic over-investment and the government's motive to offset the domestic firm's manipulative investment (see Neary and Leahy, 2000) . Transferring it in our framework, if the government cares only about the firm's profit net of taxes and subsidies (which is natural in the third market case), it would seek to provide the profit shifting instrument on its own, as a tariff or export
subsidy, and then by means of an R&D tax try to prevent the domestic firm's socially wasteful over-investment associated with both the "top dog" behaviour and (in the case of noncommitment regime) with the manipulative behaviour.
An Example
Once again applying the same functional form for R&D effort, that is, h(y) = y 2 /g, we calculate the corresponding social welfare levels in the two regimes:
and then look for the critical value of spillovers, β w (g), beyond which W* nc > W* c . While this critical value as a function of innovation efficiency is a rather messy expression, it is sufficient for spillovers to be such that β > 0.03, regardless of the value of g for social welfare in the noncommitment regime to dominate the social welfare in the non-commitment regime (see Appendix 4). The summary of the empirical work on spillovers by Griliches (1992) finds that typical values of β range between 0.2 and 0.4, far above any possible value of β w (g). Thus it is possible that W* nc > W* c even when y* nc < y* c . The main suspect for this seems to be a higher tariff in the commitment regime that causes a comparatively larger distortion in social welfare at even very low levels of spillovers. These considerations demand that we take a closer look at the tariff comparison in the two regimes, which follows in next section.
Tariffs in the two regimes
The tariffs are generally different in the two regimes due to the somewhat different functions that they perform. Namely, a tariff in non-commitment regime does not have a
"technological function" since R&D investments are already in place when the tariff is set. On the other hand, the committed government that sets the tariff, t c *, (see expression 11) takes into account the tariff's impact on the subsequent choice of R&D that is below the (first-best) social optimum. Thus, t c *, besides its profit shifting role, also has the function of stimulating R&D investment. The impact of a tariff on the subsequent unit cost reduction is captured by the term y' (where y' / dy c */dt, note that y' = x' f'(x)). Thus, in the absence of an R&D subsidy, the tariff, t c *, assumes part of the R&D subsidy's role and acts not only as a trade policy but also as an industrial or technological policy instrument. As we saw, the tariff, t nc *, does not have this role.
All of the above considerations indicate that t nc * < t c * and, we prove that this is indeed the case.
LEMMA 2
The optimal tariff in the commitment regime always exceeds the optimal tariff in the noncommitment regime. and the optimal tariff becomes a pure, profit shifting tariff (see Bhattacharjea 1995) . Thus, the tariff, t nc *, can have two roles at best: profit shifting and countering IPR violation if β >0.
We now turn to the optimal tariff when the government can make commitment, t c *. Unlike t nc *, this tariff has an additional technological function aimed at boosting R&D investment. This function is clearly seen if we evaluate (16) at β = 0 to get and observe that dt c */dg > 0.
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Finally, both (15) and (16) reduce to pure, profit shifting tariffs, when β = g = 0.
The "first-best" policy
Since in our "second-best" setup the key strategic variable-R&D investment-is under-supplied, the principle objective of the "first-best" policy is to remove this inefficiency with some other policy instrument. The natural policy tool for this purpose would be an R&D subsidy to the domestic firm.
Before we proceed, it should be made clear at the outset that the term "first-best" is not completely appropriate in this setup (a more correct name would be "constrained first best policy"). The "true" first best policy would involve three policy instruments: import tariff, output subsidy and R&D subsidy or tax. However, the optimal output subsidy would in our setup induce
the domestic firm to produce at the point where marginal costs equal price, which in turn would imply that the domestic firm serves the whole domestic market. That is, the optimal market structure would be domestic monopoly. Moreover, the optimal tariff would be zero. Since the duopoly interaction between the domestic and foreign firms and strategic tariff are at the core of our analysis, the issue of optimal output subsidy naturally has to be disregarded. More generally, output subsidy is considered to be an unrealistic (Dixit, 1988) and due to its heavy informational content often infeasible and impractical instrument (Bhattacharjea,1995) .
Despite the above cautions, we nonetheless stick with the term "first-best" policy to distinguish it from the one-instrument, "second-best" policy (which, by the above logic would be the "third-best policy") and also to be in line with Neary and Leahy's (2000) terminology who (although in their setup fully correctly) called the combination of two instruments like output and R&D subsidies the "first-best" policy.
The relevant framework is now a four-stage game that adds one initial stage to the game considered in the previous section: government commitment to a level of R&D subsidy. Again, we can, following Neary and Leahy (2000) , consider this game as basically a two stage game where in both stages the government is restrained to committing intra-temporally; thus, in the first stage the government selects the R&D subsidy before the domestic firm chooses R&D, whereas in the second stage the government commits to the tariff before the firms choose their quantities. Since the rest of the game is already solved, we turn immediately to the first stage and the government's choice of the optimal subsidy.
The objective function of the government that implements the "first-best" policy is now
given by the expression (19):
where "fb"'stands for the "first-best" and "s" denotes the subsidy. The domestic firm's profit now has an additional term stemming from its subsidy income, I / s h(y). The social marginal cost of raising a unit of subsidy is assumed to be one, and so the cost of subsidy payment for the government is T / s h(y).
Differentiating (19) with respect to the subsidy and equating it to zero while using the
domestic firm's first order condition, (envelope theorem) and noting that MΠ*/Ms = h(y*) yields (implicitly) the optimal "first-best" subsidy:
A positive optimal subsidy requires that the positive impact of unit cost reduction on consumer surplus (the first expression in (20)) dominates the negative impact of the optimal tariff on the consumer surplus and tariff revenue as well as any possible negative impact (which occurs only if β <½) of unit cost reduction on the tariff revenue. In other words, the right hand side of (20) has to be positive. Indeed, substituting the relevant values obtained by the differentiation of the expressions (5) and (6) into (20) gives Clearly, the optimal "first-best" R&D subsidy is positive, stimulating investments in R&D, removing the distortion between the privately and socially desirable R&D investment levels and ensuring the unit cost reduction to be at the socially optimal level, y s *.
We will now turn to an "R&D subsidy only" "second-best" policy. Our look at this policy will be brief since this issue is discussed at length elsewhere (see for instance, Spencer and Brander, 1983 , Bagwell and Staiger, 1994 , Maggi, 1996 , and Leahy and Neary, 1997 , Hinloopen, 1997 . In the absence of tariff, the expression (21) characterizing the optimal subsidy reduces to:
By comparing (22) with (20), it is easy to show that the sum of remaining effects in (20) is negative yielding the expected relation between the first and second best subsidy, namely 22 However, this is no longer the case if the foreign firm also invests in R&D. 
s* sb > s*. This is in line with findings emphasising the robustness of the R&D subsidy (see for instance, Brander,1995 , Bagwell and Staiger,1994 , and Leahy and Neary, 1997 , Hinloopen,1997 , and Neary and Leahy, 2000 since R&D subsidy has to boost inefficient R&D investment and act as a surrogate for the unavailable tariff. Interestingly, the level of spillovers and consequently, "toughness" or "softness" of strategic R&D investment has no impact on the sign of the optimal instrument (R&D subsidy) in either "first" or "second-best" setup. We summarise these observations in the proposition 2.
Proposition 2
Both the "first-best" and "second-best" subsidies are always positive with s* < s sb * irrespective of the level of spillovers and consequently, irrespective of whether R&D investment makes the domestic firm "tough" or "soft".
The difference from the standard results in Cournot competition where the "first-best" subsidy is negative (i.e., an R&D tax is optimal) stems primarily from the different specification of the welfare function. If we neglect consumer surplus and tariff revenue, then it is clear from (20) that the optimal subsidy will be zero.
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The reason for this is that in such a situation both the firm and the government have the same ability to commit so the firm can achieve the most advantageous strategic position on its own (see also Neary and Leahy, 2000) .
As for the "first-best" tariff, it is given by It obviously has the same functional form as the tariff in the non-commitment regime, since the tariff is no longer an instrument supporting R&D investment. However, note that as long as β > 0, the optimal "first-best" subsidy exhibits (at least indirectly) a profit shifting role by affecting the optimal tariff through its influence on the optimal level of unit cost reduction. (Note that when β = 0, R&D has no impact on the optimal tariff and once again the tariff has only a profit shifting
role). Thus, in the presence of spillovers the division of labour between the two instruments is somewhat blurred. This seems to be a robust finding since a similar phenomenon was also noticed by Leahy and Neary (1999) in a different framework with spillovers and international
competition.
An Example
We now turn to the calculation of the optimal, first-best subsidy and tariff when h(y) = y 2 /g . Substituting it into the expressions (21) and (22) respectively we obtain the expressions for the optimal subsidy and tariff:
It is interesting to note that the optimal subsidy increases in the level of spillovers. This may seem counterintuitive at first glance, since as β and y increase, so do the spillover benefits appropriated by the foreign firm. R&D subsidies are, however, an industrial policy instrument with the primary role of enhancing socially insufficient R&D investment while the other instrument (the optimal tariff) has (among other roles), an IPR violation offsetting role (note that Mt fb */Mβ > 0).
Since the optimal R&D subsidy increases with spillovers, it also triggers an increase in the tariff (see expression 22) that thwarts the spillover benefit appropriated by the foreign firm, defined as F[y s *(s),t] / β y s *q f *(y s *, t) through the negative impact of the tariff on foreign output.
Moreover, as long as spillovers are "not too high," the investment in R&D makes the domestic firm "tough" and the increase in R&D induced by R&D subsidy also reduces the output of the foreign firm 23 and thus additionally decreases the spillover benefit of the foreign firm. Larger
spillovers require larger R&D subsidies, even if the beneficiaries are foreign, not because the home government cares about foreign profits, but because, firstly, it wishes to offset the negative disincentives to investment arising from non-appropriability (see Leahy and Neary, 1999) and, secondly, because it aims to spur better exploitation of scale economies by the domestic firm (see ðigi, 2000).
Calculating the explicit "second-best" subsidy when y = (g x) ½ yields
Conclusion
We analysed the effect of different degrees of government commitment on social welfare in a duopoly game where domestic and foreign firms compete in quantities on an imperfectly competitive domestic market and where there are R&D spillovers from the domestic to the foreign firm. More specifically, we distinguished between "committed" and "non-committed" policy regimes where a "committed" government selects the policy instrument before the strategic choice of the domestic firm while its "non-committed" counterpart sets the policy instrument only after the strategic variable of the domestic firm is already in place. The latter presumes only intra-temporal commitment on the part of government (and consequently, the absence of inter-temporal commitment).
Concerning government policy, we made a distinction between "first-best" and "second-best" policies. The "first-best" policy in principle includes more than one policy instrument in order to induce a socially desirable level of strategic choice variables whereas strategic choice variable in our set up is unit cost reduction and consequently, investment in R&D. In many circumstances, however, the government may be constrained to a smaller number of policy instruments. In this "second-best" policy environment, there may be only one instrument at the government's disposal. Since, in our context, the domestic firm has two choice variables-the level of R&D investment and the quantities to be produced-the "second-best" policy implies either R&D subsidy or the import tariff (but not both of them).
As for the "second-best" policy when import tariffs are the only instrument, we showed that when R&D spillovers prevail, social welfare in the non-committed regime is higher than social welfare in the commitment regime and, consequently, higher than the corresponding welfare under a free trade regime. The reason for this result is that the optimal tariff in the noncommitted regime is lower than the optimal tariff in the committed regime, creating a smaller distortional effect on consumer surplus and tariff revenue. The benefits of the latter exceed the forgone benefits in the domestic firm's profit due to the higher tariff as soon as a small critical level of spillovers is surpassed. A sufficient condition for social welfare in the non-commitment regime to dominate is that the domestic firm's strategic variable-unit cost reduction -be higher than in the commitment regime. In effect, the domestic firm in the non-committed regime has an additional motive to over-invest in order to induce a higher tariff from the government and this additional motive makes it less sensitive to R&D spillovers. Its R&D investment and unit cost reduction, therefore decrease more slowly as spillovers rise, exceeding the R&D investment from the commitment regime as soon as a certain low spillovers threshold level is exceeded.
We demonstrated that the optimal subsidy is always positive in both the "first-best" and "second-best" policy setup irrespective of the level of spillovers and consequently regardless of whether the investment makes the domestic firm soft or tough. The reason for this is the socially inefficient level of private R&D due to the appropriability problem that subsidy aims to correct and due to the scale economies that larger R&D investment brings about. The role of the optimal subsidy in the "first-best" setup is somewhat blurred due to R&D spillovers since, besides its primary role of correcting for socially insufficient R&D, the 'first-best" subsidy also affects the optimal tariff and thus, at least indirectly, has a profit shifting role. 
where η = h'' (y c ) and X = 81 η -4 (2 -β) (7 -2β). /2). Thus, t c * < t c eq so that y c < y nc for β = 1 / 2.
(2β)(42β (7(74β)β) . Figure 1A . Figure 1A (The explicit expression for g cc (β) is extremely messy and therefore will not be reproduced here).
Thus, if g < g cc (β), social welfare in duopoly exceeds the welfare from monopoly. The curve g cc is relevant only if β > ½ since it is easy to demonstrate that welfare in a monopoly is never higher than welfare in a duopoly if β < ½. A similar procedure was performed for the non-commitment regime, but since it gave the broader regions of the parameters, the intersection of the two feasible regions coincides with the feasibility region of the commitment regime. (2784β(16168β(191444993β) ))) 0. 
To get y nc explicitly we substitute the domestic firm's first order conditions from both commitment and non-commitment regimes, (1a) and (1b), into (6). To simplify the notation we rearrange the delineates the upper border of the duopoly's feasibility region when β < ½ and it is obtained by solving the equation q f *(.) = 0. Consequently, the whole feasibility region for the duopoly market structure is a proper subset of the region g(β) # g t (β), implying t c * -t nc > 0 will hold in the whole duopoly region. Figure 6A 
